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Editorial Abstract 
Author comments on the changes in his approach to questions concerning action and 
perception, current and future status of ecological psychology, as well as specificity of 
human nature.  
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From “A note on the relation between action and perception” to… 
From “A note on the relation between action and perception” to “Ecological perspective on per-
ception-action: What kind of science does it entail?” what has changed in Michael T. Turvey’s 
approach to questions concerning action and perception? 
I am happy to be asked this question. It gives me an opportunity to reminisce (more 
than a little) and to underscore what I see as the broad theoretical significance of the 
ecological perspective for psychology and philosophy, but, perhaps more importantly, 
for science in the large.  
At the meeting of the North American Society for the Psychology of Sport and Physical 
Activity (NASPSPA) held at the University of Illinois in May 14-16, 1973, I presented a 
short paper that focused on the potentially deep similarities between perceiving a let-
ter of the alphabet (e.g., A) and the act of writing that same letter. That one could 
perceive as “same” the indefinitely many variants (in sizes, orientation, and script) of 
the letter A, and that one could write the “same” variant (more or less) of the letter A 
using indefinitely many combinations of muscles, muscular contractions, joints, and 
joint motions, suggested that the principles of A-perception and A-action were (a) ex-
tremely abstract, and (b) of like kind.  The published paper (Turvey, 1974, A note on 
the relation between action and perception) promoted the idea of mathematical symme-
try groups related through an isomorphism. AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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The 1974 paper was not strictly ecological.  It was my first foray into what I then 
termed “action theory.”  It was an opportunity to begin thinking about action in ways 
that I had been exploring perception, ways that were motivated by the style of inquiry 
expressed in James Gibson’s writings, most notably (for me) his 1959 chapter Percep-
tion as a function of stimulation and his 1966 book The senses considered as perceptual 
systems. Shortly after the NASPSPA meeting I took advantage of a Guggenheim Fellow-
ship (1973-1974) to fully acquaint myself with the Russian literature on movement 
published in the journal Biofizika (translated and published in English as Biophysics), 
particularly  the  literature  inspired  by  the  ideas  of  Nicolai  Bernstein.  His  primary 
works had been made available in English in the 1967 publication of The coordination 
and regulation of movements. In significant degree, it was Bernstein’s emphasis upon 
the topological rather than the metrical properties of movements that had encouraged 
me to think more abstractly about the grounding of the human ability to write the 
letter A. 
At this juncture I should make clear the origins of my interests in perception-action.  
My undergraduate and Master’s degrees were in physical education. I often puzzled 
over matters such as how to teach a 14-year-old the technique of discus throwing. Or 
how is it possible for a midfielder in football (I am English born) to hit a 40 m pass on 
the run to the right winger who, in seemingly one motion, chests the ball down to his 
feet and sends the ball on an inward curving trajectory to the far post where it is in-
tercepted by the on-rushing striker who directs it by his head into the goal? 
My Ph.D. degree (received from Ohio State University in 1967) is in Experimental and 
Physiological Psychology. As a doctoral student I investigated the pre-perceptual visual 
information store (later called iconic memory) and short-term verbal memory, and I 
examined the effects of cortical and limbic system lesions on learning and memory 
functions in rats. My course work was heavy on learning theory, sensory systems, 
higher brain functions, embryo- and neurogenesis, and comparative psychology. In 
the latter course I encountered the concept of “higher-order stimulus” and the name of 
its author, James Gibson. I was intrigued. That encounter, though fleeting, was pivotal 
in my career. Some months after, while studying in the stacks at the main library of 
Ohio State University, and seeking a brief respite from assigned readings, the Sigmund 
Koch volumes on Psychology: A study of a science caught my eye, particularly the vo-
lume entitled Perception. What next caught my eye was the name James Gibson in the 
list of contributing authors. I read his chapter (already identified above): Perception as 
a function of stimulation. I read it there and then. My immediate reaction: So that’s 
why it is possible for football players to do what they do! 
I should also remark on the significance of my study of embryo- and neurogenesis. 
That material introduced me to Paul Weiss and the unconventional possibility that 
order  is  not  an  a  priori  fact  of  a  biological  system  (not  program-driven,  or  other-
generated) but an a posteriori fact (execution-driven, or self-generated). 
From 1967 to 1974, at the University of Connecticut and the Haskins Laboratories, I 
dedicated myself to the parallel challenges of (a) acquiring the skills of scientific expe-
rimentation, and (b) abiding Michael Faraday’s admonition of “Work. Finish. Publish.” 
I did so as a practitioner and expositor of the information processing approach while A Remedy called Affordance 
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struggling with the relentless rethinking of psychological theory demanded by Gib-
son’s overhaul of the field’s foundational concepts. My major accomplishment in this 
period, I should note, was a body of research on peripheral and central processes in 
vision (Psychological Review 1973) that, along with my experiments on primary and 
iconic  memory  ,earned  me  the  American  Psychology  Association’s  Early  Career 
Award, the first major award, I believe, to be given in (what was then) the relatively 
new field of Cognition. 
Two papers were written during my Guggenheim year. One linked the ideas of Gibson 
and Bernstein (Preliminaries to a theory of action with reference to vision); the other 
contrasted Gibson’s approach to vision with that of the “seeing machines” of an emerg-
ing artificial intelligence (Perspectives in vision: Conception or perception?). The Gib-
son-Bernstein paper was completed early in 1974. The book it was intended for, as a 
chapter,  was  not  published  until  1977.  Fortunately,  the  paper  was  made  publicly 
available two years earlier in the widely distributed Haskins Laboratories Status Re-
port, the same year the conception-or-perception chapter was published. In combina-
tion, these two papers became the springboard for a radical rethinking of the scientific 
status of perception and action. 
What was at issue? Gibson’s growing insistence in the 1960s and 1970s for an objective 
conception of information—required in no small part by the universal success of con-
trolled locomotion by foot, wing, and fin—placed novel demands on philosophy, biolo-
gy, and physics, as duly noted by Robert Shaw (my long-term, and most important col-
league), William Mace, Ed Reed, and others. Information in Gibson’s specificational 
sense, rather than Shannon’s uncertainty-based sense, is information about.  
Claude  Shannon  pursued  the  concept  of  information  on  the  working  premise  that 
“meaning is irrelevant,” adjudging that the concept was more approachable if treated 
as a mathematical abstraction independent of meaning. It could then also be treated 
as independent of coding systems, since differences among codes would only be dif-
ferences in number of coding elements. The successes of Shannon’s formulation for 
machine intelligence and communication are obvious. James Gibson, in sharp con-
trast, pursued the concept of information on the working premise that “meaning is 
relevant.” As the basis for steering oneself through cluttered surroundings, informa-
tion must be about whether a surface affords stepping on and bounding from by you, 
an opening affords passage for you, a brink in a surface affords leaping over by you, 
and so on. Locomotion is conducted in terms of a practical semantics, in terms of 
meanings that are activity-relevant. In contrast to Shannon’s information carried by 
code, Gibson sought information as carried by invariants of energy distributions (e.g., 
multiply  reflected  light,  hydrodynamic  flows)  structured  by  environmental  layouts 
and sources relative to a stationary or moving point of observation. 
Information in the sense of information about ties down the definition of perception as 
direct: To perceive x is to detect information about x. “Perceiving x” and “detecting 
information about x” are simply two ways of referring to the same, single state of af-
fairs. The identity implies that perception is resonance-like and, thereby, a matter of 
laws and principles. The identity also implies (as Shaw and colleagues would eventual-
ly argue in 1979 and 1982) that perception is a fact of existence: It is necessarily what AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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it is and not something that can be either right or wrong. A primary implication of the 
latter is that whatever success is achieved by the epistemic functions of organism-
environment systems, it is achieved on the basis of satisfying existential criteria, not 
logical criteria. 
All classical definitions and explanations of perception are shaped by the belief that 
light to the eye, sound to the ear, and so on are nonspecific (impoverished, ambiguous) 
in respect to the environmental states of affairs responsible for them. Accordingly, 
perception must be indirect. Alhazen in the 10
th century and Helmholtz in the 19
th cen-
tury expressed the nature of perceiving as follows: Given a proximal stimulus (e.g., 
retinal image, sensations), one must both ask and answer (albeit unconsciously) “what 
distal stimulus would normally have produced it?” 
The implied central role of inference, common to almost all past and present formula-
tions of perception, is not assumed by the familiar modes of induction and/or deduc-
tion but, rather, by the mode of “abduction”, as Charles Peirce (see Harris and Hoover 
1983) chose to name it: an inference from observation to explaining hypothesis. Per-
ception understood as indirect is the (unconscious) making of inferences from effect to 
cause. Unconscious inference is paradoxical. It presumes knowing (a) the causes (hav-
ing mental representations of them) and (b) the relations between effects and their 
causes, both of which can only be acquired on the basis of unconscious inferences. As 
an important aside, indirectness marks the Gestalt alternative to Alhazen and Helm-
holtz  despite  its  dismissal  of  sense  data  and  inference.  To  paraphrase  Koffka,  the 
world does not look as it does because the conditions of stimulation are what they are 
but because the brain states are what they are. Solipsism is (at the very least) equally 
as unsatisfying as the paradox of unconscious inference.   
Expanding upon the question above of “what was at issue?” if perception is to be un-
derstood in terms of laws and principles, then what of action? In the mid-1970s we 
studied action as a separate enterprise, with Bernstein’s ideas as the focus. In the latter 
part of the 1970s the action question became more pressing to my colleagues and me 
as the limitations of the major approaches to the coordination and control of move-
ment (those deriving from cybernetics, neurophysiology, information processing, and 
artificial  intelligence)  became  more  apparent.  There  was  considerable  intelligence 
borrowing conducted (a) from an a priori stance toward the orderliness of movement 
(the prescribing of causally involved architectures and algorithms), and (b) coordinate 
with a sui generis attitude to individual action phenomena (treating them as unique 
and not explainable through general principles).  
At some juncture we realized that, for a fully consistent ecological theory of percep-
tion-action, addressing the problems of coordination and control required the kind of 
generality typically associated with physics. But what kind of physics might that be? It 
certainly could not be Newton’s, the physics of machines, but it could be that which 
Kant (1790/2000) saw expressed in organisms, a physics of self-organization involving 
“nothing analogous to any causality we know” (Section 69: 279). 
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Two developments of the 1970s helped our quest—the awarding of the Nobel Prize in 
Chemistry to Ilya Prigogine for his work on nonequilibrium thermodynamics, and the 
rapidly developing mathematics of nonlinear, dynamical systems. Prigogine’s physics 
underscored that both biological and nonbiological order of varied degrees of com-
plexity  are  a  posteriori  facts,  the  lawful  consequences  of  irreversible  (dissipative) 
processes.  The developing mathematics highlighted the evolution of stable, unstable, 
and metastable states shaping the trajectories of systems of high dimensionality, an 
evolution that followed from changes in one or a few control variables. A third devel-
opment should not go unstated, a fortuitous link between ecological psychologists at 
the University of Connecticut and the founders of homeokinetic physics (a physics for 
all systems) authored by Iberall, Soodak, and Yates. By 1980 we had made sufficient 
progress for Peter Kugler, Scott Kelso, and me to publish seminal papers with the title 
On the concept of coordinative structures as dissipative structures. 
The experimental base for the early conceptions and their evaluation has been ampli-
fied  considerably  in  the  intervening  30+  years.  Perception  experiments  have  ad-
dressed the grounding of perception in ecological optics, acoustics, and mechanics (the 
patterns of mechanical forces that support the multiple achievements of haptic per-
ception).  The  action  experiments  have  addressed  the  grounding  of  rhythmic  limb 
movements, postural organization, and inter-person coordination in the principles of 
self-organizing systems.  Underpinning the experiments in both perception and action 
were new procedures and analytic methods, either adopted from or based upon ad-
vances in the burgeoning physics and mathematics of complexity. Many were summa-
rized in Warren’s2006 Psychological Review paper on The dynamics of perception and 
action.  
In order to address the next part of the Editor’s charge, the transition to 2012, I need to 
highlight two additional publications. The book that Peter Kugler and I published in 
1987 on Information, natural law and the self-assembly of rhythmic movement provided 
a primary theoretical backdrop, what might be termed a strategic physics: a universal 
set  of  organizing  physical  strategies,  most  particularly  thermodynamic,  that  apply 
with equal emphasis across the various scales and disciplines of the natural sciences. 
The  motivation  was  Gibson’s  information  and  Iberall’s  homeokinetics  (Iberall  and 
Soodak 1987). The larger purpose, one might say, was dissolving the dualism of ani-
mate and inanimate—bringing both under the purview of law in equal degree. It could 
be viewed as a new kind of reductionism, a strategic reductionism (to common physi-
cal strategies) instead of a morphological reductionism (to common material proper-
ties). (An immediate benefit was its use as a springboard for the conception of Ecologi-
cal  mechanics:  A  physical  geometry  for  intentional  constraints  published  by  Robert 
Shaw and his son in 1987.) 
This theorizing was taken a step further in the 1991 publication with Rod Swenson on 
Thermodynamic  reasons  for  perception-action  cycles.  An  argument  for  a  direct  and 
deep connection of perception-action to thermodynamic principles was built on the 
cornerstones of (1) maximum entropy production, (2) inexorability of order produc-
tion (because order produces entropy faster than disorder), (3) evolution as a global 
phenomenon (the system “Earth” at its highest level evolves as a single global entity), AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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and  (4)  Gibson  information.  Perception-action  cycles  arise  from  the  opportunistic 
coordination  of  (4)  with  self-organizing  dynamics.  Their  significance  is  amplifying 
opportunities to produce ordered flow and consequent dissipation of potentials at a 
faster rate.  The argument  itself  was  that  the progressive  emergence  of perception-
action  cycles  (the  nonergodicity  of  species)  in  Earth’s  evolution  is  a  lawful  conse-
quence of opportunistic physics. It was (and is) how (1) is satisfied. In a 1995 publica-
tion, Toward an ecological physics and a physical psychology, my colleague Shaw and I 
suggested that the metaphysical hypothesis of organism-environment dualism that has 
tended to dominate psychological theory (implicitly or explicitly) can be, and should 
be, replaced by the scientific fact of organism-environment mutuality and reciprocity. 
This latter scientific fact nests Gibson’s affordance. 
So, now, how has my approach to action and perception changed between the early 
foray in 1974-1980 and 2012, with the latter captured in the chapter Ecological pers-
pective on perception-action: What kind of science does it entail? and its companion 
piece  (written  with  my  wife,  Claudia  Carello)  On  intelligence  from  first  principles: 
Guidelines for inquiry into the hypothesis of physical intelligence (PI)? 
Ideally, given my remarks above, it should come as no surprise that ecological psy-
chology can be considered as a psychology for all organisms, the 96 phyla that com-
prise the Five Kingdoms—Bacteria, Protoctista, Animalia, Fungi, and Plantae (Margulis 
and Schwartz 1982/1998). It can be considered as a psychology that aims to understand 
how all organisms “make their way in the world” (see Reed 1996)—how they perceive 
and act. It should also be evident that ecological psychology, at least as interpreted by 
my closest colleagues and me, pursues the desired understanding in terms of identify-
ing conceptions, theory and methods up to the charge of delivering a law-based ac-
count of the phenomena characteristic of nature’s ecological or mesoscopic scale. In 
this regard, note that the expansion (signaled by the colon) of Ecological perspective on 
perception-action is What kind of science does it entail? 
The science currently in force in the study of perception-action, and cognition in gen-
eral, focuses primarily on Animalia in the phylum Craniata, and on explanation deriv-
ative of nervous-system properties and expressed in a language of artifacts that com-
pute (in language-like symbols, or neural-like states). While all members of Animalia 
other than sponges are endowed with nervous systems, the size of the endowment is 
not a straightforward index of perception-action competence (see McCrone’s 2006 ap-
praisal of the jumping spider Portia labiata). That nervous systems are absent in the 
four other kingdoms means that the vast majority of perceiving-acting systems lie out-
side the explanatory scope of a science that gives primacy to the nervous system. 
In reviewing the lineage of Ecological perspective on perception-action (scheduled for a 
2013 publication) I have presented both explicit examples and subtle clues as to the 
look of the entailed science. Here, I add (with minimal but ideally sufficient detail) two 
further examples, that of affordance and that of prospectivity. 
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A primary desideratum is ecological ontology, organism-specific descriptions of the 
surrounding surfaces, substances, and media that clarify how any given habitat (where 
an organism lives) is partitioned into distinct niches (how an organism lives). The eco-
logical furnishings, Gibson suggested, are affordances. In respect to all five kingdoms, 
an affordance is an invariant combination of properties of surface and substance tak-
en with reference to an organism and specific to an action performable by the organ-
ism. The niches of organisms comprise possibilities for action, and are perceived as 
such .As an organism moves (like an animal, or a bacterium), or grows (like a plant), or 
ramifies (like a fungus), or spreads (like a mold), relative to its surroundings, some 
action possibilities persist, some newly arise, and some dissolve, even though the sur-
roundings, analyzed classically as objects in Euclidean relationships, are unchanging. 
Gibson in his 1979 book summarized an affordance thusly: It exists whether or not it is 
perceived or realized, it cuts across the subjective-objective dichotomy, and it is equal-
ly a fact of environment and behavior. What kind of science does affordance entail? 
The answer, I suggest (and present in Ecological perspective on perception-action), is a 
science of objective relational properties that includes among its fundamental notions 
compatibility (in the quantum sense of other relations remaining potential when one is 
actualized) and impredicativity (defining properties in terms of the system they consti-
tute). In several publications, Anthony Chemero and I have explored the relevance to 
ecological  psychology  of  non-well-founded  set  theory  and  the  impredicative  defini-
tions that it supports (e.g., in Biological Theory 2007). 
Eleanor Gibson (1994; see also Reed 1996) singled out agency as the core phenomenon 
to be explained by psychology. Its three defining properties are prospectivity, retros-
pectivity, and flexibility. In approximate terms, prospectivity and retrospectivity are 
the abilities to coordinate current behavior with emerging and prior states of affairs, 
respectively. In similarly approximate terms, flexibility is the ability to vary the means 
to achieve an end. Agency, I would argue, is characteristic of all phyla to greater or 
lesser degree. If such is the case, then each of the defining properties must be based in 
a generic principle. For example, rather than asking how the future is produced from 
an internal model, one should ask about the coupling (between organism and envi-
ronment) that results in coordination with the future. 
Prospectivity relying on systemic lawfulness can be termed strong anticipation, follow-
ing a suggestion by Dubois in 2001. Voss (2000) has identified a general framework for 
the anticipation of a “master” system (e.g., light-dark cycle) by a “slave” system (e.g., 
organism) with delays, namely, dx/dt = g(x), dy/dt = f(y) + k(x - yτ). The term yτ identifies 
a past state of y delayed by τ. The effect of the coupling term k(x - yτ) is to minimize the 
difference between the state of x at the current time, and the state of y at a past time. If 
this  difference  is  successfully  minimized,  then  the  difference  between  the  present 
state of y and the future state of x is also minimized. The effect of this minimization is 
the synchronization of y with the future of x (for physical and biological examples see 
papers by Nigel Stepp and colleagues 2010, 2011). The basic coupling dynamics can be 
extended in two ways: by including multiple x values delayed relative to a given y val-
ue, or by including multiple y values relative to which a given x value is delayed. As 
suggested by Stepp in his 2012 dissertation, there may be a universal equation encom-
passing all variants of strong anticipation—all variants of lawful prospectivity. AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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The capstone of the line of inquiry from the 1974 paper (which first paired the terms 
perception and action) to the present is the focusing of my efforts and those of several 
of my colleagues on the so-called hypothesis of physical intelligence (PI), alias intelli-
gence-from-first-principles. The overarching concern of avoiding loans of intelligence, 
or “self-actional explanatory terms,” as Dewey and Bentley would have said in 1948, 
puts a premium on understanding the ill-defined but intuitive notion of intelligence 
through the strategies that collectively define the ecological approach to perception-
action. In a paper in the first of several planned special issues on PI in Ecological Psy-
chology, Claudia Carello and I identified 24 guidelines for seeking intelligence from 
first principles. 
 
The Present and Future of Ecological Psychology 
What is the current status of ecological psychology?  
What dangers or misunderstandings do you see?  
What will be the role of ecological approach in the future? 
The final chapter of Ed Reed’s portrayal of the life and science of James Gibson sum-
marizes the status of ecological psychology within the field circa 1988. I would say that 
much has remained the same since that summary. The mentalistic and mechanical 
models that we associate with Descartes and Helmholtz and Sherrington continue to 
dominate, buttressed by the versatile current instantiations of Turing machines and 
Turing’s mechanization of mathematics and thinking. The contemporary satisfaction 
obtained from tying hypothesized mental functions to anatomical networks revealed 
by fMRI and other modern technologies is creating a deepening sense of comfort with 
the theoretical status quo. From the latter perspective, the critical reexamination of 
the base concepts demanded by ecological psychology is seen as largely unnecessary 
and irrelevant—as just so much heterodoxy. 
Also conforming to Reed’s 1988 summary is the continuing tendency for select theoret-
ical  and  methodological  advances  within  the  ecological  perspective  on  perception-
action  to  be  incorporated  into  the  old  language  of  standard  theories  of  sensory 
processes  and  motor control.  Especially  bothersome  is  the  co-opting  of terms  (e.g., 
affordance and optic flow) for uses in cognitive science, human factors, and education 
that are conceptually at some remove from their definitions and usage in ecological 
psychology. 
What  makes  the  ecological  approach  to  perception-action  challenging  is  that  it  re-
quires honest recognition of the obvious: Physics is not done yet! In our 1995 paper 
Toward an ecological physics and a physical psychology, Shaw and I set the stage with 
the statement (inspired by Robert Rosen, 1991) that “Material systems that express 
‘knowing about’ are more general in respect to the principles that underlie them than 
the material systems that physics currently addresses.” The sections of this paper are 
(i) organism-environment mutuality and reciprocity, (ii) toward a functional seman-
tics, (iii) controlled locomotion as the paradigmatic form of “knowing about,” (iv) phys-
icalizing and intentionalizing information, (v) intentional behavior as a symmetry of 
the ecological scale, and (vi) direct perception: symmetry again. Only by recognizing A Remedy called Affordance 
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and addressing the incompleteness of physics can we hope to reverse the historical 
tendency of treating perceiving, acting, and knowing as necessitating special explana-
tion outside the purview of universal physical principles. 
For an appreciation of my expectation for the future role of ecological psychology I 
recommend Turvey and Shaw (1995) and suggest special attention to their inserts en-
titled “Psychology on the cusps between the past, present and next centuries” and “Di-
rect perception.” 
 
On Human Nature 
Does human nature pose an important challenge? Is there any mystery to it?  
Are these questions too trivial in the 21
stcentury? 
My answer to this question paraphrases Reed’s Conclusion to his 1996 book. 
Ecological psychology is the study of how organisms encounter their world (precisely, 
their habitat—where they live, and their niche—how they live). Ecological psychology 
has plenty of room for appreciating the specialness of human life but as a scientific 
stance it does not hold human life separate from the rest of the planet’s life forms nor 
the encounters of other life forms less real than those of humans. The specialness of 
human life is the richness and non-ergodic nature of human encounters (occupying 
niches that did not exist previously) necessitated by the great and volatile diversity of 
human surroundings. Its study is far from trivial, and we should expect it to place sig-
nificant demands on scientific inquiry in the 21
st century. 
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